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LMERS
Miranda that Military Review
needs to devote more time to it.
CliffordC. Nelso~
CooperC@,Fbidh

Information Age Army or
Empty Rhetoric? ~1~
S;n& 1922,Militay Reviewhas
provided a forum for the open
exchange of ideas on military
affairs within the Army community. Its mission has been, and still
is, to fbcus on concepts, doctrine
and warfighting at the tactical and
operationallevels of war and support the education, training, doctrine development and integration
missions of the US Army Combined Arms Center and the US
Army Command and General
StaffCollege at Fort Leavenworth.
After51 yearsas a monthlypublication, Militiry Review is transitioning to bimonthly production.
This retrenchment has resulted
from across-the-board cuts in the
US Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) operating
budget. Tune and again, America
has been criticized for its lack of
strategic insight in both business
and governmental decision making. The Army, faced with a budgetary policy that is strangling its
professionaljournals, can now be
accused of strategic myopia also.

In an attemptto cutaway excess
fat vital muscle and organs have
now been severed because of
shortsighted budgetaq policy.
Much has been mentioned about
Force XXI and its envisioned
“overwhelming competitive edge
against any enemy through the
application of America’s superior
information-age technology,” as
outlined in the Army 1994-1995
Green Book. However, contrary
to the establishment of an information age Army, the vital neural
net embodied in Militwy Review
and other Army publications ~quired to create that freighted
vision,is now in a processof being
dismantled.
Other official Army publications, such as Parameters,Am<
Infmtv andAmy RD&4 Bulletin,
which already operate on either a
bimonthly or quarterly schedule,
are also facing this new round of
budgetarytightening. I was unable
to obtain even limited research
support iiom Armor becauseof its
lack of staffing, Why the Army is
now overlooking the value of information that exists off the battlefield and on another plane-one
where ideas concerning doctrine
and wtilghting principlesare generated-is beyond comprehension.
For decades, Army leadership
has ensured that its major publications were properly staffed and

budgeted. That this budgetary decision is taking place now is even
more paradoxical, given that retired General Frederick M. Franks
Jr., former TRADOC commander,
wrote in the same edition of the
Gwen Book, ‘Ideas must change
first when reshaping our Army to
remain a relevant strategic force
capable of decisivevictory. It is in
doctrine that we record those ideas
about warfightingand the conduct
of operations other than war.”
I agree with the general’s sage
insights. The revolutionin military
affairs is not only about advanced
technology and red~me battlefield information-it is about new
ideas to incorporateand efficiently
use the byproducts of emerging
weaponry and command, control,
computers, communication and
intelligencetechnologiesinto basic
Army force structure and doctrine
for the puqmse of warfighting.
Billions can be spent on the
research, development and acquisition of advanced technology
hardware. However, if the Army
cannot properly use these tools of
war on the battlefield, this capital
investment in America’s fiture
will have been made in vain.
Arguments can be made for the
Army’s continued commitment to
the innovative Battle Command
Battle Lab (BCBL) program that,
continued on page 104
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as Franks stated, is “an institutional approach to
experimentingwith the ideasof wherebattleand other
operations appear to be changing.” Because these
ideasare institutionalized,they are not open to candid
and constructivecriticism as they would be in Army
journals. Therefore, the resulting ideas are liable to
reflect a corporatemind-set that, if left unchallenged,
may cause more harm than good to the Army’s 2lst–
century modernization program.
MilitaryReview’scriticalroletoward the successful
creation of Force XXI cannot be understated. New
ideas, specifically those freely expressed and not subject to an institutionalmentality, are the driving force
behind successful implementation of Force XXI.
With its wide range of contributor backgrounds and
experiences, combined with the innovative BCBL
program, the Army possesses a tw~rong
approach
to the 21st century-an
approach that creates an
intense synergy between both institutionalized and
noninstitutionalized ideas. One look at the references
found in TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Fome Ml
Operations, and this fact is confirmed.
If A4ilittvy Review had gone bimonthly at the
beginning of 1994, instead of 1995, information representing approximately 50 percent of the journal’s
1994 contents would not be available to the Army
community. To portray tlis significant information
loss, the contents of the January and July 1994 issues
are listed below. The informational equivalent of four
other issues would also not have been published.

January

1994

Issue:

USA. “Ulysses S. Grant and
America’s Power–ProjectionArmy.”
� L~ John H. Tllelli Jr., USA. “Force Projection: Essen�

GEN

tirdon

R. Sullivan,

tial to Army Doctrine.”
� L’~
Robert L. Ord 111,USA, and

MAJEd Momston,
USA. “Light Forces in the Force-projection Army.”
� Graham H, ‘lltilville Jr. “OperationsOther Than Wac
OrganizedCrime Dimension.”
� CC)LWilli~ W. Mendel, USA (Ret). ‘The Haiti Contingency.”
. L~ &offrey B. Demarest, USA. “The Cuba Contingency.”
. MAJ Francis A. Galgano Jr., USA. ‘The Landings at
Anzio.”
� MAJ ROtXII
M.
Puckett,
USARNG. ‘The RapidoRiver
Crossings.”
� COL peter F.Herrly,USA, ‘The Army’sLightDivisions:
WhereNext’?’
July 1994 Issue:
. GEN J, l+ Binford Ray III, USA. “BuildingAmerica’s
Power– ProjectionAmy.”
� LTG Carmen J. Cavezza, USA, et al. “A Bridge to the
Future.”
� I-TC Mark (jemer, USA. ‘The Dratl in Reverse: The
Training Base and the IndividualReady Reserve.”
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� MAJ Darien L. Kearns, USMC. ‘The Need for Criteria
in UN Peace Operations.”
� L~
Lester W. Grau, USA (Ret). “From the Ashes: A
Russian Approach to Future Maneuver War.”
� COL Richard M. Swain,
USA (Ret). “Adapting to
Change in Ilmes of Peace.”
� LTC Donald R. Faint,USA. “contingency Intelligence.”
� COL Cole C. KingSeed, USA. “OperationCobra: Prelude to Breakout.”
� LTC Myron J. Griswold,
USA. “Focusing Combat
Powec Seeing is Whining.”
These articles represent new ideas that generate
intellectual discussion on doctrine and wtu%ghing
within the military community, as well as in the government and academic communities. Given the journal’s past operating budge~ only $126,000 annually,
the preceding articles represent a very cost-efficient
means of facilitating the Army’s transformation to
Force 2QU. Also, when compared to the Army’s
weapon systems modernization programs, which
were collectively budgeted for more than $750 million in 1994, the journal’s budget was minuscule.
Because Military Review will reduce its frequency
to only six issues a year, many new and innovative
doctrinal ideas and concepts may not be publicized in
1995-thus
lengthening the time between article
acceptance and publication. As witnessed by how
quickly aspects of the June 1993 US Army Field
Manual 100-5, Operations, have become outdated,
such lengthened publishing lag time is unacceptable.
Wkh the revolution in military affairs, the rapid flow
of information is more critical now than ever.
Information has long been recognized as a vital
sinew of war. Since the “Warring States” period in
ancient Chin% there has been an accepted truth that in
war the last thing a nation or its army does is cut off
its own information flow. The goal is to blind the
enemy—not one’s self. In the post-Cold War world,
a rapidly changing natiomd security environment
must face the specter of endemic non–Western warfare. By relegating Military Review to a bimonthly
publication, and at the same time reducing its other
publications, the Army is partially blinding itself.
Why such a policy that goes against 2,500 years
of strategic military thought and the Army’s self–
acknowledged information age metamorphosis was
implemented is a mystery.
Instead of denying itself the immense advantages
that the neural net of Army publications provides, the
Army should consider establishing a centralized structure within TRADOC to ensure these publications are
properly supported and the ideas they generate—fi-om
within and outside the Army-are effectively directed
toward the Iidfillment of the Force XXI vision. As an
initial step in this ~gard, it is my opinion that Military
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Review should return to monthly publication so that it
can continue to carry out its vital mission as the focal
means of transmitting the open exchange of ideas on
doctrine and warfighting.

Robert J. Bunker,Cbemoti, CaZ&omiu

Specter of My Lai Haunts US Military
I commend Military Review for its August 1994
article “Promoting the Rule of Law and Human
Rights” by Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey F. Addicott and
Major Andrew M, Warner. It addresses a subject seldom considered in professional military journals. I do
not, however, share the authors’ belief that US forces
are known to countries around the world as having
“functioned superbly under a rule of law.”
The authors, like most of my fellow officers, appear
to forget the blackest day in US military history, which
occurred 27 years ago. On 6 March 1968, soldiers of
Charlie Company, Task Force Barker, Americal Division, entered the Vietnamese village of Son My, better
known to Americans as My Lai-4. By day’s end, US
forces had murdered over 500 unarmed villagers.
Their “simple, direct and brutal tactics” included
raping and killing mothers in front of their children,
children in front of their mothers; executing the village’s Buddhist priest in front of his followers; and
then, mutilating the bodies of the dead or dying. The
soldiers of Charlie Company received no hostile fire
fi-om the village and sustained no casualties except
one self-inflicted injury.
The documented evidence from the official Department of the Army inquiry conducted under the late
Lieutenant General William R. Peers, along with trial
transcripts and personal testimonies, is overwhelming.
Ronald Ridenhour, the courageous soldier who
exposed the massacre and its subsequent cover–up to
the US Congress, called it “a Nazi kind of tling.”
Documented actions against My hi civilians were
even more savage than the Nazi actions against the
villagers of Oradour, France, during World War Il.
I am not bemoaning the failure of our military and
civilian justice systems to hold specific individuals
accountable for an atrocity committed a quarter century ago. I am ashamed, however, of my profession’s
failure to address the factors existing in the participating commands before the massacre.
One factor listed in the official US Army inquiry
was the “permissive attitude toward the treatment and
safeguarding of noncombatants.” Investigators also
found that hostility toward anyone not of a European
or Judeo--christian culture was common among officers. Unfortunately, these attitudes are common today
among my peers.
The report also noted a “lack of emphasis in training” on the Geneva Conventions, handling and safeguarding of noncombatants and rules of engagement.
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Rather than engendering a self-examination by military professionals of the law-of-war training, this
reqnred training has remained the most stale and least
emphasized. US Army Field Manual 27–10, 77zeLaw
0$ land War$are, dated 1956, is probably the oldest
manual in the inventory. The little training I have
received in this area, as both an enlisted soldier and
ofllcer, has been pathetic. The curriculum of the US
Army Combined Arms and Services Staff School, US
Army Command and General Staff College, did not
even address the laws of land warfare.
Addicott and Warner posit that “the United States
has traditionally promoted by treaty, declaration and
action [emphasis added] the fullest possible range of
meaningful human rights.” How can professionals in
a US military that cannot address its darkest human
rights failure make such a claim? Our failure to
address our own past in any of!lcial medium and our
subsequent failure to learn from it does not lend credibility to the authors’ claim that “US Armed Forces
have functioned superbly under a rule of law . . . . “
President George Bush was premature when, after the
Gulf War victory, he declared the Vietnam Syndrome
buried forever. Until my profession faces the specter
of My Lai, the Vietnam Syndrome will haunt my profession and its ethical veracity.
I asked whether the Army would recognize the
25th anniversary of the My Lai massacre, Finally a
letter from the OffIce of the Secretary of the Army,
chief of Media Operations, was sent to Senator Sam
Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, saying there are “no such events which have
been or are presently being planned to commemorate
this incident.” Many of my peers have never heard of
My L& and far too many even consider William
Calley a misunderstood “American Hero.”
CPT Lawrence P.Rockwood,~W, Heudqu.mlm, lUfh
Mounlain Diviswn (Light), Foti Drum, New York

Compelling Belligerents is Tricky
Ret&d Lieutenant Colonel John Hunt’s article,
‘Thoughts on Peace Support Operations” (October
1994 iWili&zry Review), was superb. Hunt’s insights
clari~ this ofien confusing subset of operations other
than war. There are two points I would question.
First, when discussing peace enforcement operations, Hunt notes that inserting neutral military units
into the area of conflict can be a challenge. One option
he suggests is entering via an air or seaport controlled
by a belligerent party after gaining that party’s consent. He fhrther notes, “Accompanying psychological
operations (PSYOP) must persuade the other belligerents that the intervening force is not arriving to support [the party which allows the insertion].”
This is absolutely right and practically impossible.
Except in exceptional circumstances, one cannot gain
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